Emergency (IPC Phase 4) likely in several IDP settlements through January

Key messages

- **Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are assessed in Somalia from June to September in the areas worst affected by flooding, conflict, and the 2020-2023 drought.** Many pastoralists and some agropastoralists are benefiting from recent livestock births, milk availability, and livestock productivity, while in agropastoral and riverine areas, the second consecutive below-average harvest due to flooding is limiting typical seasonal improvement in access to food and income. An estimated 3.8 million people remain displaced, many of whom face moderate to large food consumption gaps and receive inadequate food assistance.
- **Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will likely persist in some areas from October to January**. Favorable flood-recession harvests will become available and livestock births — supported by good conception rates in early 2024 — are expected; however, La Niña conditions will likely bring rainfall deficits in late 2024 and below-average *deyr* 2024/2025 harvests. The benefits of the preceding above-average rains on livestock production will likely partially and temporarily mitigate negative impacts on pastoralists' food security.
- The **areas of highest concern** include IDP settlements, southern riverine areas of Gedo and Middle Shabelle regions, central and coastal pastoral areas, as well as some southern and northern agropastoral areas. An estimated **3-4 million people still need food assistance, and needs are anticipated to peak from June to August, largely driven by flood-induced crop losses during the 2024 *gu* season.**
- Despite the high food assistance needs, **a scale-down of assistance is anticipated**. As of June, only roughly 40 percent of the funding requirements for Somalia's 2024 food security and livelihoods response have been met. Budget constraints suggest assistance levels will further scale down through late 2024. As conflict, flood, and drought-displaced households lack the resources to meet their needs, **Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are anticipated in several IDP settlements through January.**

Projected acute food insecurity outcomes, June – September 2024



Projected acute food insecurity outcomes, October 2024 – January 2025



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

Learn more

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 15, 2024. Follow these links for additional information:

- Previous Somalia Food Security Outlook: February to September 2024
- Latest Somalia Key Message Update: May 2024
- Latest Somalia Seasonal Monitor: June 10, 2024
- Overview of FEWS NET's scenario development methodology
- FEWS NET's approach to estimating the population in need
- FEWS NET's approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

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Analysis in brief

Scaled-up food assistance and livelihood support are necessary to support flood-, drought-, and conflict-affected areas in the south-central and northwestern regions

Somalia is facing a second consecutive season of poor crop production due to riverine and flash floods, the early cessation of *gu* rainfall, and conflict in crop-dependent livelihood zones in the south. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in severely flood-affected areas and several internally displaced person (IDP) settlements through the end of the year. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely in other riverine areas and IDP settlements, as well as several pastoral and agropastoral areas in the southern, central, and northwestern regions through early 2025. Elsewhere, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) or Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are largely supported by the continued recovery of livestock productivity, reproductivity, and saleability. However, food assistance and livelihoods support in the affected areas is critical to promoting the recovery of livelihood assets, preventing food consumption gaps, addressing atypically high levels of acute malnutrition, and reducing the use of unsustainable coping strategies.

Figure 1. Favorable vegetation conditions in most parts of Somalia, as seen in the eVIIRS Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI)



Source: USGS/FEWS NET

Over 3.8 million people (over 20 percent of the national population) remain internally displaced due to persistent conflict and recurrent weather shocks which have eroded livelihoods and depleted coping capacity. Limited agricultural labor opportunities amid high competition are severely limiting access to income and food. With high food prices and limited access to social support, thousands of displaced households are heavily reliant on severe negative coping strategies that harm the population's ability to meet their food needs in the future. The ongoing delivery of food assistance is outpaced by the high level of need, and IDPs are at high risk of facing deteriorating acute food insecurity and nutrition outcomes during the scenario period unless food assistance is scaled-up.

Extreme flooding in April damaged *gu* standing crops, constrained crop production, and reduced income opportunities during the April to June 2024 *gu* rains. While favorable flood-recession harvests are expected to improve access to food by September, many riverine households will likely sell a large portion of this harvest to repay debts, maintaining food consumption deficits. Households in the worst flood-affected areas of Middle Shabelle, Lower and Middle Juba, and Gedo regions require support to repair river embankments and farm and irrigation infrastructure to recover ahead of the 2024 *deyr* season.

Many pastoral and livestock-dependent agropastoral areas are seeing gradual recovery with recent livestock births and production; however, several pastoral and agropastoral areas continue to suffer the impacts of past drought years. In *Addun* and *Coastal Deeh Pastoral* livelihood zones in central Somalia, households continue to face low livestock productivity, below-baseline herd sizes, and sustained high debt burden**.** Similarly, some of the worst drought-affected agropastoral areas in the south and northwest continue to face food consumption gaps due to limited seasonal improvements during the *gu* season amid prolonged dry spells negatively impacting *gu* crop production. Throughout the projection period, some households are anticipated to see deteriorating food security outcomes due to the rapid depletion of food stocks in some agropastoral areas and limited herd sizes to support households in meeting their minimum food needs in pastoral areas.

Weather forecasts show an increasing likelihood of La Niña-induced below-average October to December *deyr* season rains, likely to result in a third consecutive season of below-average crop production nationally and deteriorated pasture conditions by January. In areas most severely impacted by the 2020-2023 drought, households have had insufficient time to fully recover their livelihoods and remain highly vulnerable to future weather shocks. In pastoral areas, while the last two seasons of above-average rainfall benefited pasture and water availability supporting improved livestock productivity and reproductivity, many herds in north/central regions remain below baseline levels and households are unable to reduce or close food consumption gaps. The forecast below-average *deyr* rains are likely to drive deterioration in food insecurity by January 2025.

Between April and June, humanitarian food assistance only reached 5-10 percent of the national population in Somalia. An average of around 1.8 million people received monthly assistance from January to May, peaking at just under 2.3 million people in February/March, then reducing by roughly 43 percent to only 1.3 million people in June. Amid funding shortfalls, significant reductions in the delivery of food assistance continue in Bay Region, the largest concentration of IDPs in Somalia.

Food security context

Somalia contains a mixture of pastoral, agropastoral, and riverine livelihood systems. The country's two main rainy seasons — the April to June *gu* season and the October to December *deyr* season (Figure 2) — dictate seasonal patterns of crop and livestock production. While locally produced crops are a key food source in cropping areas, imports account for 60 to 70 percent of domestic food consumption, and pastoralists typically purchase imported rice, wheat, and other staples. As of early 2024, the internally displaced population totaled 3.8 million (nearly 20 percent of the total population).

Since 1991, conflict has forcibly displaced millions and rendered much of southern and central Somalia inaccessible to humanitarian actors. The impacts of al-Shabaab's insurgency, exacerbated by government-led counter-insurgency operations, inter- and intra-clan violence, and chronic political instability, have undermined the local food system and driven a long-term decline in agricultural productivity. Violence, extortion, and movement restrictions frequently disrupt income-generating activities, livestock migration, and trade flows, and render the food system more vulnerable to concurrent climate shocks.

Somalia is also subject to climate extremes, alternating between drought and floods. Severe droughts tend to occur after two or more consecutive poor or failed rains. Over the last 15 years, drought brought parts of Somalia to the brink of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in 2016/17 and 2022/23, and Famine (IPC Phase 5) claimed the lives of an estimated 260,000 people in 2010/11 and 220,000 people in 1992/93. Increasingly, severe drought is followed by record-breaking floods, as in 2019 and late 2023. The 2020-2023 drought drove widespread displacement and loss of livestock, and five consecutive poor harvests, leading to high household debt levels and a breakdown of social support systems. Subsequent favorable rains have facilitated some recovery; however, the once-in-a-century floods in late 2023 also inundated cropland, destroyed irrigation infrastructure, and displaced nearly a million people in southern riverine and agropastoral lowland areas. Recurrent weather shocks, protracted conflict, and chronically high poverty levels have increased household vulnerability to future hazards due to the erosion of livelihoods and coping capacity. Full recovery — especially sustainable levels of livestock ownership — would take several years.

In **agropastoral and riverine areas**, the *gu* and *deyr* rains coincide with the cropping lean season prior to harvests in July and January. Maize, sorghum, and cowpeas are key staples, and cash crops (sesame, horticulture) produced by better-off households offer a source of labor income to poor households. During the June to January outlook period, the *gu* harvest typically provides food and income from July to September. Riverine areas are susceptible to seasonal flooding but may benefit from off-season harvests in September. During the *deyr* lean season, poor households rely on labor income to purchase food before the harvest.

In **pastoral areas,** food and income from livestock milk production, reproduction, and sales typically peak during and after the *gu* and *deyr* rains. During the June to January outlook period, seasonal improvements are particularly pronounced from May to July and November to January, coinciding with the peak of livestock births; additionally, domestic and export demand for livestock will peak in June during the *Hajj*. Conversely, food and income will be lowest during the dry season from July to September, when depleted pasture and water resources drives declines in livestock saleability and milk production.

Figure 2. Seasonal calendar for a typical year



Source: FEWS NET

Current food security conditions as of June 2024

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers' needs by developing a "most likely" scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section.

*Key guiding principles for FEWS NET's scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household's **risk of acute food insecurity** is a function of not only **hazards** (such as a drought) but also the household's **vulnerability** to those hazards (for example, the household's level of dependence on rainfed crop production for **food and income**) and **coping capacity** (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of **local livelihoods**, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET's scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF's Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.*

Key hazards

Conflict: Conflict remains elevated at similar levels observed in 2023 in southern and central regions, driving displacement, disrupting trade flows and livelihoods, and resulting in the destruction of property and loss of life. According to data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) from January 1 to June 15, a total of roughly 1,140 incidents of violent conflict have occurred, resulting in an estimated 2,634 fatalities. Fighting between the Somalia National Army (SNA), with increasing support from local clan militias, and al-Shabaab expanded and escalated in parts of the central regions, such as Galgaduud and Mudug, driving recent waves of displacement and impacting wet season livestock migration patterns. Additionally, there has been a notable increase in the frequency of improvised explosive device (IED) explosions in Mogadishu in retaliation for recent military offensives; more IED attacks occurred from January to April 2024 compared to all of 2023. The high levels of conflict have periodically disrupted planting and cultivation activities in the Shabelle and Hiiraan regions, as well as hindered normal trade flow, impacting the distribution of available food from main producing surplus regions to deficit markets. This development has led to considerable increases in food prices, particularly in some rural in central regions.

Figure 3. Cumulative Rainfall Anomaly, April 16-June 15, 2024



Source: UCSB CHC

Weather: The 2024 *gu* cumulative rainfall was slightly to moderately above average in most regions, though with erratic temporal distribution. Despite a timely start in early to mid-April – with the exception of delays in parts of the northeast and Sanaag regions – the above-average rains were concentrated in April and early May, followed by dry spells and below-average rains from mid-May to the end of June in most areas of the country. Most pastoral areas of Awdal Region, parts of eastern Sool and Sanaag, and the northern parts of Bari experienced moderate 10-50 millimeter (mm) rainfall deficits (Figure 3). A prolonged dry spell in May, a critical period for *gu* season crop growth, has caused severe moisture stress and wilting for some of the standing crops in south-central regions. However, the rains were sufficient to support favorable rangeland and pasture regeneration and water availability across the country.

Flooding: Consecutive seasons of El Niño-driven flooding in October to December 2023 *deyr* and January to April 2024 *gu* have displaced households, destroyed infrastructure, and negatively impacted crop production in key riverine areas. Riverine communities in Middle Shabelle, Lower and Middle Juba, Gedo, Hiiraan, Bay, and Gedo regions experienced the destruction of river infrastructure (such as canals, culverts, and irrigation pumps) which negatively impacted agricultural inputs, labor and income opportunities, and constrained overall *gu* seasonal cereal and cash crop production. According to the UNOCHA May 30 report, approximately 68,000 people have been affected by the *gu* floods and 81,000 people were displaced, over half of whom were from Beletweyne in Hiiraan Region (Figure 4). Additionally, water contamination associated with the

heavy rains and flooding has led to a spike in reported cases of acute watery diarrhea/cholera; the Federal Ministry of Health notes 12,327 cases and 114 deaths since January, a 1.0 percent case fatality rate.

Crop pests: Atypically severe infestations of crop pests and diseases have disrupted growth and damaged crops in several high-producing agropastoral areas of the south. In a normal year, newly hatched insects would typically be washed away during heavy rains, limiting extensive damage to crops; however, the early cessation of rains in early to mid-May resulted in an atypical increase in hatchling survival, resulting in significant damage to standing cereal and cash crops. According to FEWS NET and FSNAU field reports in May, stemborers, grasshoppers, crickets, pigs, and rodents (including rats) were reported to have caused damage in agropastoral areas of Bay and Bakool, Middle Juba, and Shabelle regions.

Figure 4. River water levels in the Shabelle River at Beletweyne, Hiiraan (2023, 2024, and long-term mean)



Source: FAO SWALIM

Analysis of key food and income sources

Crop production: Following the favorable start to *gu* rains in most agropastoral areas in April, which supported above-average cropland area planted and seed germination, **poor and erratic rains in late May and June caused moisture stress and wilting, and severe insect infestation resulted in poor *gu* production prospects in central, northwestern, and southern agropastoral areas.** Meanwhile, *gu* flooding in riverine areas limited and delayed planting and damaged standing crops in the south.

- In **riverine areas of the south**, severe flooding inundated irrigated and lowland rainfed farms in Gedo, Hiiraan, Lower and Middle Juba, and Middle Shabelle regions in April and May. Data from a FEWS NET post-*gu* crop assessment in May indicates approximately 60 to 80 percent of riverine farmland was inundated, destroying most of the remaining *deyr* off-season crops and the early-planted *gu* maize and cash crops**.** The largest losses were reported in Lower and Middle Juba and Middle Shabelle regions. In *Riverine Pump Irrigation* livelihood zone in Gedo and Hiiraan regions, farmers delayed planting due to the remaining floodwater from *deyr 2024* and in anticipation of the *gu* flooding, delaying harvesting until the off-season. Meanwhile, in Barava, Kurtunwarrey, and Sablaale districts of Lower Shabelle Region, cropping conditions are favorable as rising river levels permit access to water for irrigated cropping. *Gu* off-season recessional cropping started in early June with the early cessation of *gu* rains, and off-season standing crops are at the early vegetative stage of crop growth as of mid-June.
- In **agropastoral areas in the south**, including Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Juba, and Shabelle regions, despite above-normal cropping area planted in April and May, the early cessation of *gu* rains and the outbreak of crop pest and rodents negatively impacted late-planted crop development at the vegetative stage in June. Maize and sorghum crops in the agropastoral lowlands, which constitute approximately 20 to 30 percent of crops, are at the tasseling and seed-filling stages in mid-June and were largely unaffected by the dry conditions experienced in May and June.
- In the ***Cowpea Belt Agropastoral* livelihood zone** in central Somalia, normal seed germination in April and average to above average *gu* rains in April and early May favored healthy crop development, improving most cowpea crops between the harvesting stage and seed-filling stage. However, rising insecurity in central Somalia has resulted in population displacement, limiting cropping activity in these areas; as a result, cowpea crop prospects will likely be poor.
- In the **northwest agropastoral areas**, crop area planted was above average given the exceptional *gu* rains received in April and early May. Short-cycle sorghum in *Togdheer Agropastoral* livelihood zone and yellow maize and cash crops (including watermelon, onion, green vegetables, and tomato) in *Northwestern Agropastoral* livelihood zone, were planted and will likely be harvested in June/July. Long-cycle white sorghum was planted in May in *Northwestern Agropastoral* livelihood zone; good seed germination occurred, and crops are at the vegetative stage. Harvest would typically be expected in November following the k*aran* rains; however, the May dry spell caused severe moisture stress, and sorghum and maize crop failure is imminent. Farmers are busy with tractor tillage and dry-planting long-cycle sorghum.

Livestock production: The *gu* rains improved access to green pasture and browse, supporting improvement in livestock health, including body conditions, productivity, and reproductivity. In the northern and central regions, including rural areas of Hiiraan Region and *Coastal Deeh* and parts of *Addun Pastoral* livelihood zones, livestock has shown a remarkable recovery

from the impacts of the severe 2020-2023 drought. Livestock body weight has generally improved and is approaching optimal levels with above average-vegetation conditions. However, in the Juba regions, camel productivity and reproductivity have been severely affected by the camel trypanosomiasis disease, and in Erigavo and Laasqoray districts of *Northern Inland Pastoral* livelihood zone, tick-borne and diarrheal diseases are affecting sheep and young goats, respectively.

Most pastoralists who migrated out due to poor pasture conditions during the drought have returned, resuming customary seasonal migration patterns and moving short distances within their respective livelihood zones to access the improved pastures. However, in the *Northwestern Agropastoral* livelihood zone, cattle have migrated to adjacent *Hawd Pastoral* livelihood zone, where pasture and water are more abundant. Similarly, livestock from the *East Golis Pastoral* livelihood zone and Gabi Valley in the Erigavo and Laasqoray districts have moved to Sool Plateau in neighboring *Northern Inland Pastoral* livelihood zone to access better pasture.

In most of the country, **herd sizes have reached near-baseline to baseline levels, though total livestock ownership in some areas generally remains below baseline levels due to the lasting impacts of the droughts.** *Medium* to *high* goat and sheep birth rates occurred during the *gu* season and *medium* cattle and camel calving occurred due to *medium* conception in 2023. However, in *Coastal Deeh*, *Addun*, and *Hawd Pastoral* livelihood zones of central Somalia, *Southern Inland Pastoral* livelihood zone of Hiiraan Region, and *Togdheer Agropastoral* livelihood zone of Togdheer Region, herd sizes are still substantially below baseline due to high livestock losses and distress sales during the drought years.

With improved livestock health and recent livestock births, **poor households have had increased access to goat and camel milk gifts from middle and better-off households since April.** Despite below-baseline numbers of lactating camels, **camel milk yields have improved to average in many livelihood zones** (including *Addun, Guban, Hawd, Northern Inland*, and *Southern Inland Pastoral*) due to the good grazing availability and *medium* camel births. Similarly, in areas where cattle are reared (including *Northwestern Agropastoral* and *Juba Cattle Pastoral* livelihood zones and agropastoral areas of Bay, Hiiraan, Gedo, and Juba regions), total cattle milk availability has improved to average to good and poor households are also accessing cattle milk gifts.

Given the three successive seasons of near- to above-normal rainfall with improved livestock births and conception rates**, *low* to *medium* camel, *medium* cattle, and *medium* to *high* sheep and goat conception rates took place between April and June 2024 in most areas**. *Medium* to *high* small ruminant conception rates were driven by the favorable *gu* season which allowed a larger proportion of the herd that gave birth in April and May to be available for conception in June.

Off-own-farm sources of income: Off-own farm income sources in agricultural areas have experienced significant fluctuations in recent months. Daily agricultural labor wage rates generally declined between April and May due to flood-related impacts. In Middle Juba, agricultural wage rates are 67 and 76 percent lower than last year and the five-year average, respectively, due to flood impacts and limited labor demand in the region and surrounding areas. In Middle Shabelle, however, wage rates decreased slightly between April and May, but remain higher than last year and the five-year average due to high labor demand in neighboring agropastoral areas that were unaffected by the floods.

In Middle Shabelle Region, grass fodder prices dropped considerably between March and May 2024. Costs for a donkey cart of grass fodder fell as much as 50 percent (180,000 to 100,000 Somali Shilling [SOS]). Similarly, the price of crop fodder has decreased by 60 percent (1,800,000 to 700,000 SOS). These declines have limited fodder profitability, resulting in many poor households turning to agricultural labor opportunities to augment their income despite the recent decreases in agricultural wage rates. In ***Togdheer Agropastoral* livelihood zone in the north**, grass fodder production was poor to average this season due to the average but temporally erratic *gu* rains and flash flooding from the watershed of nearby *West Golis* livelihood zone. This negatively impacted labor and self-employment opportunities for poor households, two of their main income sources. Concurrently, **households engaging in firewood collection and sale activities has increased in the south;** however, waterlogged soils and damaged roads from flooding have hindered transport of firewood to markets, leading to an increase in firewood prices well above the five-year average.

Market supplies: Overall, locally-produced cereal supply is below-average, driving elevated and above-average cereal prices. Market dependence for food remains highest among poor households living in urban areas, IDPs, and pastoralists, particularly in the central and northern regions. The 2023 *deyr* harvest in January temporarily increased market supply, though crop production was approximately 17 percent below average due to the severe flooding. While off-season sorghum production boosted sorghum supply in March/April, there was limited off-season maize production to supply the markets. Minimal carryover stocks from previous seasons are unable to meaningfully buffer supply deficits, and delayed *gu* 2024 harvests are also contributing to the limited supply.

As a result, **locally-produced cereal prices were high and above average in May.** In Baidoa of Bay Region, the key reference market in sorghum-producing areas, the price of sorghum was 10,667 SOS/kilogram (kg) in May, 31 percent higher than April, and 25 and 32 percent above last year and the five-year average, respectively. In Qorioley of Lower Shabelle, the key reference market in maize-producing areas, the price of maize was 10,500 SOS/kg in May, similar to the previous month but 18 percent higher than May 2023 and the five-year average.

Cross-border imports continue to help mitigate the supply gap in central and northern markets. However, the price of most imported foods (such as vegetable oil, wheat flour, and rice) indicate mixed trends in different parts of the country, influenced by local and external factors. Imported food item prices are stable or declining slightly month on month in most parts of the country, but prices of most imported commodities are significantly higher overall (20 to 45 percent) compared to last year and the five-year average, respectively. This is primarily due to high oil prices and increasing international shipping costs due to insecurity in the Red Sea and piracy. Meanwhile, in the northwest, local conflict continues to disrupt supply routes which has contributed to moderate price increases in May. More information on locally-produced and imported cereal and commodity prices in key reference markets can be found in the May Somalia Price Bulletin.

Household purchasing capacity: In most agropastoral areas, households are experiencing mixed household purchasing capacity. In most of the southern regions, the labor-to-cereals terms of trade (TOT) atypically decreased from April to May, largely due to the atypically low seasonal agricultural labor demand during the *gu* agricultural season following the floods (Figure 5). In Hiiraan Region, for instance, a day of casual labor in May 2024 could buy 7 kg of red sorghum on average, which is 30 and 22 percent lower than last year and the five-year average, respectively. Additionally, in flood-affected riverine areas of Middle Shabelle, Gedo, and Juba regions, which experienced reduced labor demand, lower labor wages, and increasing cereal prices, the TOT is 11 to 30 percent below the five-year average.

Figure 5. Labor-to-cereal terms of trade (ToT): percent change between May 2024 and April 2024, May 2023, and the five-year average in key markets



Source: FSNAU/FEWS NET

In pastoral areas, household purchasing capacity has relatively improved compared to recent years but remains below normal. In May, the local quality goat-to-rice TOT in most pastoral areas has been supported by increased livestock demand in local and export markets during the Hajj season and mostly stable rice prices, increasing in most regions by up to 10 percent compared to April. However, the TOT remains up to 49 percent lower than May 2023 and average levels in most areas. In Galgaduud and Gedo regions, the May TOT are an average 52 kg and 41 kg of rice per local quality goat, respectively, which is 5 percent below 2023 and the five-year average. Many poor pastoralists face additional limitations on their purchasing power due to limited livestock assets; their current herd sizes are still low and recovering from previous droughts. Furthermore, in conflict-affected areas of Sool Region and neighboring regions where livestock and food markets remain disrupted, such as Sanaag and Togdheer, the TOT were 20 to 49 percent below average in May.

Poor IDP and urban households are facing extremely low household purchasing capacity. Most poor IDP households have lost all productive livelihood assets, have minimal income-earning opportunities, and are heavily impacted by flood-and-drought-related declines in agricultural labor demand and wages, particularly in the south. Amid high food prices, FSNAU estimates food purchases constitute nearly 75 percent of household expenses, rendering households highly vulnerable to reductions in income opportunities or wages.

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is "significant" (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET's guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET's broader analysis, as applicable.

Figure 6. Percent of national population reached with emergency humanitarian food assistance by WFP and partners, monthly, January 2021 to May 2024



Source: FEWS NET, using data from the Somalia Food Security Cluster

Humanitarian Assistance: Despite large funding shortfalls, the provision of humanitarian food assistance increased by 55 percent from the planned levels from January to April 2024, reaching an average of 10 to 15 percent of the population. Most recently, in May 2024, 5 to 10 percent (1,355,520) of the population received humanitarian food assistance (Figure 6), very similar to planned levels. Nonetheless, food assistance was outpaced by need. Partially due to the high number of IDPs in Baidoa town and its surroundings, nearly 20 percent of all food assistance was distributed in Bay Region from January to April; however, humanitarian assistance in Bay in April was reduced by 30 to 47 percent compared to the preceding months. Humanitarian efforts are hindered by ongoing conflict, particularly in the southern and central rural regions under insurgent control; the delivery of food assistance faces significant restrictions in Middle Juba, Hiiraan, Middle Shabelle, and Lower Shabelle regions. While cash transfers are the primary method of aid distribution and allow recipients to obtain assistance flexibly, this approach carries substantial risks due to insurgents targeting individuals receiving aid.

Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of June 2024

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the "!" symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

Current acute food insecurity outcomes, June 2024



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

IDPs: The proportion of IDPs facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes remains substantial and has likely increased in June. Delayed *gu* season cropping and flooding in riverine and agropastoral lowlands have led to a significant decline in labor opportunities and wages among IDP households. Consequently, IDP households are facing high competition for few labor opportunities, substantially limiting access to income. Additionally, the lack of strong social support networks and below-average *deyr* main and off-season harvests, which limited crop *zakat* for poor households in March and April, has resulted in inadequate access to food in most IDP settlements. Repeated displacement from conflict, drought, and flooding over the last several years have led to the loss or exhaustion of household and livelihoods assets and severely eroded household coping capacity. The ongoing delivery of food assistance is

outpaced by the level of need and most IDPs are experiencing moderate food consumption gaps indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. In Baidoa, Galkacyo, and Xudur settlements, slightly higher levels of humanitarian food assistance are mitigating more severe food security outcomes, and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) is assessed in June. In Dolow, Dhuusamareeb, and Laascaanood settlements, the compounding impacts of conflict, flooding, high food prices, lack of income-earning opportunities, and depleted coping capacity amid insufficient levels of food assistance are driving extreme food consumption gaps; area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are assessed, and households are employing associated negative coping strategies including begging in the community. During the above-average gu rains, seasonal increases in water and vector-borne diseases amid persisting high levels of acute malnutrition in IDP settlements and limited access to health and nutrition services emphasizes the continued and urgent need for life saving intervention and support.

Riverine areas: Current food security outcomes have been significantly impacted by consecutive seasons of severe flooding, which has inundated farmland, limited cereal production and labor opportunities, and driven atypically high maize prices. Riverine areas of **Hiiraan, Lower Shabelle, and the Juba regions are likely facing area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3),** with a substantial number of **poor households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4)** in June. Displacement, crop and infrastructure damage, and a rise in waterborne diseases have limited household access to food and income. However, the flooding in these areas has increased the availability of fish and wild fruits/vegetables, partially alleviating more severe food insecurity outcomes. In the riverine areas of **Gedo and Middle Shabelle regions**, the areas worst-affected by the flooding, households are enduring large food consumption deficits and assessed to be facing **Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes at the area-level.** The widespread destruction and inundation of farmlands both destroyed some standing crops, delayed crop planting, limiting agricultural labor opportunities, and resulting in poor to no availability of green crop consumption in June. With limited to no remaining *deyr* cereal stocks, households are highly purchase-dependent for food. However, the below-normal agricultural labor opportunities in many areas and disrupted income from many off-own farm income sources amid high staple food prices has resulted in extremely low purchasing capacity for poor households. Many households have engaged in labor migration, either to neighboring agropastoral areas or nearby urban centers, while others are highly reliant on wild foods to survive.

Pastoral areas: In most pastoral areas, gradually increasing herd sizes and improvements in livestock body conditions and saleability have supported increased access to food and income in June. Favorable livestock births during the *gu* season in most areas and a notable increase in milk production, both for household consumption and commercial sale, has helped mitigate the need for unsustainable livestock sales and atypical migrations. However, despite the increases in herd sizes and better livestock-to-rice TOT than recent years, many pastoralists continue to struggle with meeting their basic food needs solely through the sale of livestock and related products. A significant portion of the income derived from livestock sales continues to be allocated towards repaying debts incurred during successive drought years. In parts of **central and northern *Addun* and *Coastal Deeh Pastoral* livelihood zones area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes** persist as herd sizes and livestock ownership remain substantially below baseline levels from the 2020-2023 drought and households have minimal access to milk or income. In the pastoral livelihood zones of ***Guban*, *East Golis*, *Hawd*, and *Northern Inland Pastoral* and *Southern Inland Pastoral* (Gedo region) livelihood zones, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes** are supported by gradually increasing livestock holdings, milk availability, and improved livestock reproduction.

Agropastoral areas: In most agropastoral areas in the south, area-level Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are assessed; however, an increasing number of households are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) amid the atypically prolonged agricultural lean season. The premature cessation of the *gu* rains has decreased agricultural labor opportunities, particularly weeding activities, and resulted in a lack of available green harvests of maize, sorghum, and cowpea for consumption in June. Consequently, poor households have below-normal income levels ahead of the projection period, constraining their ability to meet all essential non-food needs, despite the relatively low price of sorghum. Livestock ownership, though minimal in these livelihood zones, is supporting some access to milk for consumption and sales due to favorable births during the *gu*. However, to purchase staple food, many are resorting to curtailing their non-food expenditures. In contrast, ***Bay Bakool Agropastoral Low Potential*, *Northwestern Agropastoral*, and *Togdheer Agropastoral* livelihood zones are assessed to be enduring area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes**. The scarcity of household cereal stocks has led to a high purchase-reliance for food; however, the atypically low agricultural labor opportunities and wages, minimal livestock ownership, and soaring staple food prices in these areas due to market supply limitations are severely limiting household purchasing capacity and access to food. These households are facing food consumption gaps, and poor households are likely relying on coping strategies typically linked to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, such as selling productive assets.

Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions through January 2025

*The next step in FEWS NET's **scenario development process** is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes **hazards** and **anomalies** in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the **"most likely" scenario**. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.*

National assumptions

- With the elevated likelihood of La Niña (70 percent chance between August to October and 79 percent chance during November-January) and the Indo-Pacific sea surface temperature anomalies, cumulative rainfall during the **October to December 2024 *deyr* rains** is expected to be moderately below average.
- The **July to September *xagaa* dry season** will likely be relatively normal, with average access to dry pasture and water for livestock, despite the early end of the *gu* rains and forecast above-average temperatures.
- **Armed conflict associated with the al-Shabaab insurgency** is expected to continue amid the drawdown of ATMIS forces, albeit at lower levels of intensity compared to those observed in the first half of 2024.
- In Sool, **skirmishes between Somaliland forces and secessionist Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) regions** are likely to resume during the July to September 2024 dry season and spread into the frontline rural settlements between Caynabo and Laascaanood, and Elafweyn and Xuddun districts.
- According to the World Bank and African Development Bank, **economic growth** is projected to be 3.5 percent in 2024, up from 3.1 percent in 2023, driven by increased food production which supported private consumption and export demand. **Inflation** is projected to reduce slightly in 2024 as supply chains stabilize; however, large trade deficits due to the high reliance on imports will continue to stunt the economy.
- According to FEWS NET's price projections, **locally-produced staple cereal prices** are anticipated to rise through July 2024 and exhibit a seasonal decline in August and September with the onset of the *gu* harvest. However, cereal prices are projected to increase unseasonably quickly due to the anticipated below-average *gu* crop production, before declining with the *deyr* harvest in January 2025. The anticipated below-average 2024 *gu* and 2024/25 *deyr* crop production are expected to result in low market supply and high demand, driving cereal prices higher than last year and the five-year average through the projection period in key reference markets in the south and northwest.
- Based on FEWS NET's analysis of price dynamics in Qorioley and Hargeysa, the price of a kilogram of sorghum or maize is projected to range from 5 to 25 percent above the five-year average in the south, and from 30 to 70 percent above average in the northwest (where imported rice is preferred over sorghum and maize). Given the expected below-average *gu* harvest due to moisture stress in agropastoral areas and severe flood damage in riverine areas, compounded by expected below-average cereal harvests from source markets in southeastern Ethiopia, **household and market cereal stocks are expected to be lower in 2024 than in 2023**.
- In northern Somaliland, **cereal prices are expected to be significantly higher than last year and the five-year average** through January 2025 due to consecutive poor harvests in northwest agropastoral areas and inadequate imports from Somali Region of Ethiopia.
- External supply shocks – including increasing oil prices and supply chain disruptions such as the Rea Sea Crisis and emerging piracy off the coast of the Indian Ocean – will likely continue to place upward pressure on the already above-average **prices of imported rice, wheat, vegetable oil, sugar, and fuel**. Imported food prices are expected to remain stable at above average levels through the projection period.

Sub-national assumptions for agropastoral and riverine areas

- The **June to September *karan* rains** in northwestern Somalia will likely be above average.
- The **July to August *xagaa* coastal showers** in Shabelle and Juba regions will likely be above average. *Xagaa* rains are likely to benefit the late-planted *gu* crops.
- The **2024 *gu* cereal production** in riverine and agropastoral areas from the main harvest in July/August is projected to be 40 to 50 percent below average due to erratic *gu* rainfall performance, reliance on ratooning practices for sorghum in

Bay Region, below-average area planted, reported crop losses due to dry spells/moisture stress in May, pest incidence, and poor current cropping conditions in agropastoral areas. In riverine livelihood zones in Lower and Middle Juba, Middle Shabelle, Gedo, and Hiiraan regions, poor *gu* crop production is anticipated. However, cash crop cultivation of crops such as sesame is expected to be above average due to elevated demand.

- The **off-season *gu* harvest** in riverine livelihood zones is expected in September/October and will likely be average to above average in most areas. Following the flooding of 50 to 60 percent of farmland in riverine areas in May, water recession will likely increase through September and the forecast below-average October to December *deyr* rainfall will reduce flood risk. However, September harvests will be reduced in the worst flood-affected areas, as off-season cultivation will likely be lower due to expected persistent waterlogging and limited access to inputs (e.g., seeds and tractor hire).
- The **2024/25 *deyr* cereal harvest** in January is expected to be below average due to the forecast below-average *deyr* rainfall. However, the lower likelihood of river flooding during the *deyr* will likely support generally favorable off-season *deyr* recessional cropping activities in riverine areas; however, the off-season harvest will likely occur outside of the projection period, in February/March.
- **Agricultural labor demand** and wages in the southern agropastoral areas are expected to be above average through August due to expected above-average *xagaa* showers that will likely boost the late-planted and off-season recessional crop development, above-average cash crop harvests and off-season *gu* cereal harvests. Agricultural labor demand for land preparation and planting for the *deyr* season in September/October is likely to be normal; however, demand for weeding and harvesting from October through January is likely to be below average based on the forecast below-average *deyr* rainfall.
- In riverine areas, **agricultural labor demand** is expected to be lower than typical but gradually increase through September following seasonal engagement in recessional cultivation. Agricultural labor opportunities and income are expected to improve from October through January due to the expected normal river water flow from below-average *deyr* rainfall. In the *Riverine Gravity Irrigation* livelihood zone in the Juba and Middle Shabelle regions, prospects for recessional cultivation during the *xagaa* and *deyr* seasons are anticipated to lead to normal agricultural labor demand from October to January.
- In northwestern *karan*-receiving agropastoral areas, the ***gu/karan* maize harvest** is most likely to reach near-crop failure due to severe moisture stress caused by the prolonged dry spells at critical crop growth stages in May. Above-average June to September *karan* rainfall and limited risk of desert locust invasions will likely support favorable long-cycle sorghum crop production, with average harvests expected in October and November. Agricultural labor demand will likely be normal through November.

Sub-national assumptions for pastoral areas

- **Pasture and water availability** is expected to seasonally decline during the July to September *xagaa* dry season in most areas, except in the northwest, where above-average *karan* rainfall is expected to continue to regenerate vegetation. Similarly, improvement in pasture and water resources from July to August is expected in the Juba and Shabelle regions and southern Bay Region, where above-average *xagaa* showers are expected. Subsequently, the below-average October to December *deyr* rainfall forecast will likely negatively impact pasture and water availability, resulting in mixed to below-normal levels through January 2025.
- Based on current livestock conditions and water and pasture availability, **livestock body conditions** a**nd productivity** are expected to remain normal with seasonal deterioration during the dry season through September. Based on the past two consecutive seasons of favorable rainfall, it is expected that projected below-average rainfall will be adequate to generate sufficient pasture to support livestock health, productivity, and reproductivity during the October to December *deyr* season, though atypical movements in search of better pasture and water are likely.
- **Camel and cattle calving rates** are expected to be *medium* in June/July across the country, and *low* to *medium* in December/January, based on camel and cattle conception rates during the 2023 *deyr* season. Based on anticipated *medium* to *high* conceptions in the 2024 *gu* and *xagaa* seasons, *medium* to *high* **goat and sheep kidding** is expected in the *deyr* season.
- **Milk availability from camels and cattle** is likely to vary seasonally with green pasture conditions and livestock births in both pastoral and agropastoral areas. Milk yield will likely increase through mid-August, decline in October, then increase again between November and January with the *deyr* rains. However, milk volumes per animal will likely remain below-

baseline, given the below-average rainfall projected in the *deyr* season. In riverine areas, milk availability will increase as livestock migrate to the dry season grazing areas in the riverine areas and peak between August and September.

Humanitarian food assistance

National assumption

- The Food Security Cluster's plans for humanitarian food assistance delivery beyond June are unavailable. However, funding shortfalls and recent WFP office closures suggest that trends in levels of food assistance are likely to be scaled down in 2024 and reach less than 10 percent of the population.

Sub-national assumption for displacement settlements

- While areas with populations of highest concern, such as large IDP populations, will most likely continue to be prioritized for food assistance deliveries, it is assumed that deliveries will reach less than 25 percent of the population at the district or IDP-site level, and decline during the projection period due to funding constraints.

Table 1.

Key sources of evidence FEWS NET analysts incorporated into the development of the above assumptions

Key sources of evidence:		
Weather and flood forecasts produced by NOAA's Climate Prediction Center, USGS, the Climate Hazards Center at the University of California Santa Barbara, and NASA	Conflict analysis and forecasts produced by ACLED, Control Risks Seerist, Signal Room, and Aldebaran	Key informant interviews with local extension officers, humanitarian implementing partners, and community leaders
FEWS NET rapid field assessment conducted in Middle Shabelle and IDP settlements in Dolow and Mogadishu in May 2024.	Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSNA) conducted by FSNAU and partners in March 2023	Displacement tracking data by UNHCR PRMN and IOM DTM
FEWS NET East African Regional Sorghum Supply and Market Outlook FEWS NET East Africa Cross Border Trade Report, April 2024 FEWS NET Somalia Price Bulletin, May 2024 FSNA/FEWS NET Market Monitoring	Historical trend analysis of crop production through FSNA data and Food Security Assessment missions	Food Security Cluster food assistance distribution data, including analysis of historical trends

Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2025

*Using the key assumptions that underpin the **"most likely" scenario**, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households' ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the "!" symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.*

IDPs: IDPs in settlements will continue to face highly limited access to income and social support, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist in IDP settlements through January 2025 and remain the population of highest concern. IDP households will most likely continue to face highly limited access to income and social support while remaining dependent on market purchases for food amid elevated staple food prices. Seasonal improvements in the availability of food and income opportunities with the *gu* harvest in agropastoral and riverine areas will be insufficient to mitigate food consumption gaps. While the off-season cultivation will offer temporary increase in labor opportunities, households will face high competition with rural poor households. The anticipated below-average *deyr* 2024 rains and crop production will also likely limit labor opportunities and as well as result in atypically low crop *zakat* during the post-harvest

periods, limiting seasonal improvements in food access in December and January as well. This, compounded by high and rising local cereal prices later in the year, is likely to drive an increase in the number of households experiencing acute food insecurity. **IDPs in Baidoa, Dolow, Dhuusamareeb, Galkacyo, Laascaanood, and Xudur settlements are most likely to continue experiencing extreme food consumption gaps and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through January amid insufficient food assistance.**

Riverine areas: Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food security outcomes are anticipated to persist in the *Riverine Gravity Irrigation* livelihood zone of Middle Shabelle and the *Riverine Pump Irrigation* livelihood zone of Gedo through September. Anticipated substantially below-average *gu* main season harvests in riverine areas will likely limit normal seasonal improvement in food access and income in July, extending the lean season through at least September when off-season harvests become available. Households will have minimal to no food stocks and be almost entirely market dependent in a context of extremely limited access to income and high cereal prices. However, improvements in access to food and income starting in September with anticipated favorable off-season cultivation and increased agricultural labor opportunities during the October to December *deyr* season are anticipated to partially alleviate food consumption gaps in late 2024. Improvement to **Crisis (IPC Phase 3) at the area-level is likely by January; however, a substantial portion of poor, flood-affected households will remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).** In the other riverine areas where the impacts of flooding were slightly less severe, households will benefit from some *gu* cultivation in July, and the benefits of recessional cultivation and the off-season harvest will not materialize until September.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely persist through January. The sustained impacts of the flood and persisting conflict will continue to limit food and income access; however, recessional cultivation in August and September, followed by the October to December *deyr*, will increase agricultural labor opportunities, and the availability of wild fruits, vegetables, and fish will help mitigate larger food consumption gaps. **Pastoral areas: Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will be widespread through January in most pastoral areas in the northern, central, and Hiiraan regions, supported by increasing herd sizes and milk access.** Average to good pasture and water availability as of June, and mostly *medium* to *high* livestock births during the *gu* will likely sustain relatively normal livestock productivity and value during the dry July to September *xagaa* season and help offset distress livestock sales and debt repayments that occurred during the drought years. While La Niña conditions during the *deyr* will likely bring rainfall deficits in late 2024, the effects of the preceding above-average rains on livestock health and production are expected to partially mitigate the impacts on food security in pastoral areas the medium term. **However, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) remains likely in *Addun* and *Coastal Deeh Pastoral* livelihood zones of central Somalia where households are struggling to recover from the 2020-2023 drought and herd sizes remain below baseline.** Households have limited saleable livestock and low milk availability. These households additionally depend on crop *zakat* as a supplementary source of food, which is expected to be low through late 2024. As a result, most poor pastoral households will face difficulty earning enough income to purchase their minimum food and non-food needs despite anticipated above-average goat-to-cereals TOT. The Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely be sustained through January due to below-average *deyr* rainfall, overstretched social support, continuing low availability of saleable livestock, and a moderate decline of livestock value and goat-to-cereals TOT.

In *Juba Cattle* and most parts of *Southern Inland Pastoral* livelihood zones in the south, increased calving during the projection period will result in an increase of livestock holdings to baseline levels, supporting increased income from livestock and milk sales as well as average milk consumption. Minimal (IPC Phase 1) food security outcome are expected through January 2024.

Agropastoral areas: Despite the delayed and below-average *gu* crop production anticipated in July/August, the seasonal improvement in food access and income associated with the harvest is still expected to partially alleviate food consumption gaps through September. In most agropastoral livelihood zones in the south, household food stocks are expected to last for only roughly two months (instead of the typical four or more months); however, some seasonal milk availability from livestock births during the *gu* will supplement household access to food and income. Due to the limited harvests for middle and better-off households, poor households will have below-normal access to labor income and limited crop *zakat* through September. **Area-level Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, with some poor households experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3), is likely from July to September.** However, **Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected at the area-level, with some households likely in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), where the *gu* harvest is expected to have the highest deficits** due to the impacts of early cessation of rains and late-season dry spells, pests, and/or conflict. Households are expected to only have one month of *gu* food stocks after debt repayment and will likely increasingly seek cash/in-kind gifts to access food and resort to distress livestock sales despite below-baseline herds. Poor households will likely be unable to meet their minimum food needs, or marginally meet their minimum food needs through unsustainable coping strategies such as purchasing food on credit and selling household or livelihood assets. These areas include *Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral* livelihood zone in the south, and *Northwestern Agropastora*l and *Togdheer Agropastoral* livelihood zones in the north.

With forecasted below-average October to December *deyr* rains associated with the onset of La Niña rainfall conditions, a third consecutive below-average national harvest is anticipated. In the south and central agropastoral livelihood zones, food security outcomes are expected to deteriorate by January. As households deplete off-season cereal stocks, have access to limited agricultural labor opportunities, and face high cereal prices, household purchasing capacity will further decrease. Agropastoral households with some remaining livestock will benefit from improved milk availability for consumption and sales, partially alleviating labor income deficits. Anticipated below-average *deyr* harvests in January will be the third consecutive below average harvest for many households and only provide minimal reprieve from the prolonged agropastoral lean season. Increasing numbers of households will likely face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, although **Stressed (IPC Phase 2) *outcomes* are expected to persist in most areas at the area-level through January. However, in *Cowpea Belt Agropastoral* in central Somalia and *Southern Agropastoral* livelihood zone of Hiiraan Region, deterioration to area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) by January is assessed amid persisting high levels of insecurity, limited supplementary livestock ownership to help mitigate food stock deficits, and the anticipated worse impacts of the *deyr* harvest, particularly on cowpea production in central Somalia. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will be sustained in *Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral*, as well as *Northwestern Agropastoral* and *Togdheer Agropastoral* livelihood zones**, and an increasing proportion of poor households will likely deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) due to multiple consecutive below-average harvests, below-normal labor opportunities, limited remaining livestock assets, and depleted coping capacities.

Events that may change projected acute food insecurity outcomes

*While FEWS NET's projections are considered the "most likely" scenario, there is always a **degree of uncertainty** in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET's scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a **credible alternative scenario** and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.*

National

Event: Scale-up of humanitarian food assistance and livelihood support

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A substantial scale-up of humanitarian assistance, along with the delivery of livelihood support to generate more income opportunities (particularly in riverine areas and IDP settlements), would likely support thousands of households in meeting their basic food needs without resorting to unsustainable coping strategies. Improvement to Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes would be anticipated in some rural areas, including *Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral* livelihood zone and riverine areas in the south and the *Addun* and *Coastal Deeh Pastoral and Fishing* livelihood zones of the central regions. In displacement settlements, ongoing humanitarian food assistance and the provision of livelihood support and vocational skills training would probably improve outcomes to Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!), preventing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes or worse.

Event: October to December 2024 *dery* season is significantly below-average or fails

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Significantly below-average and highly erratic rains during the *deyr* would likely result in significantly below-average *deyr* crop production in agropastoral areas in southern, central, and northern regions. Consequently, extremely below-average food and income access from crop production and sales would likely result in limited to no seasonal improvement in food security outcomes with the *deyr* harvests in January. With limited time for recovery following the historic 2020-2022 drought and severe flooding in 2023 and 2024, households would have been unable to fully replenish livestock herd sizes, repay debts, and recover productive assets. As such, acute food insecurity would likely deteriorate among the worst affected households, particularly in agropastoral livelihood zones in the south and northwest, with an increasing number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes from October to January. Similarly, in most pastoral areas, gradual and fragile recovery from the 2020-2023 drought renders the population highly vulnerable to weather shocks. In areas where pasture and water resources have not yet fully replenished from the previous two seasons of cumulative above-average rainfall, pasture may deplete faster than anticipated resulting in deteriorating livestock body conditions and poor productivity, particularly across poor households that are unable to migrate longer distances to access better pasture. An increasing proportion of pastoral households will likely face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, particularly in central and northern pastoral livelihood zones.

Event: Near-average rainfall in the October to December 2024 *deyr* season

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A timely onset and near-average temporal and spatial distribution of *deyr* rainfall would likely permit normal *deyr* crop production activities in agropastoral areas in southern and central regions. Consequently, average *deyr* crop production would be expected, resulting in higher-than-anticipated food and income from crop production and sales, as well as improved labor opportunities for poor households. This would facilitate some poor households in rebuilding their asset bases, repaying debts, and accessing credit for food purchases during the October to December agropastoral lean season. A reduction in the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) would be likely and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes at the area-level would be expected to prevail in most south-central agropastoral areas. Average rainfall would also likely lead to continued improvement in pasture and water conditions as well as sustain favorable livestock conceptions, births, and milk production during the *deyr* 2024 season. A portion of the population projected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes from October to January would likely improve to Stressed (IPC Phase 2), and livelihood zones facing area-level Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes would likely increase. However, in riverine areas, communities remain vulnerable to future flooding due to remaining open river breakages and high soil saturation from the last two seasons of flooding. Near-average rainfall would likely increase flood risk in the October to December *deyr* season, with the potential to damage crops and drive a fourth consecutive season of below-average national production, particularly for maize. Sustained Crisis (IPC Phase 3) with an increase in households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would be likely in the worst-affected riverine areas.

Featured area of concern

Riverine Gravity Irrigation Livelihood Zone in Middle Shabelle Region (Figure 7)

Reason for selecting this area: *There are multiple areas of high concern in Somalia. FEWS NET has selected one area of concern for this report to illustrate why the riverine population remains of high concern. Riverine areas in the Middle Shabelle Region have struggled to recover following destruction caused by successive seasons of severe river flooding, crop losses, high local cereal prices, and significant erosion of income-earning activities. The population in Riverine Gravity Irrigation livelihood zone in Middle Shabelle Region (150,455 individuals) is of highest concern in Somalia and accounts for roughly 18 percent of the total riverine population in Somalia.*

Period of analysis:	June to September 2024	October 2024 to January 2025
Highest area-level classification	Emergency (IPC Phase 4)	Crisis (IPC Phase 3)
Highest household-level classification	Emergency (IPC Phase 4)	Emergency (IPC Phase 4)

Households in *Riverine Gravity Irrigation* livelihood zone rely primarily on agricultural activities for income and food. In a typical year, most income comes from farm labor (54 percent) and crop sales (29 percent), with additional earnings from firewood and fodder sales (14 percent) and gifts (3 percent). Annual food comes from purchases (53 percent) and own-crop production (37 percent), with the remainder coming from gifts and wild foods (10 percent).

While conflict has been long-standing in Middle Shabelle, **an uptick in fighting between insurgents and the government, as well as clan conflict, has significantly hindered engagement in livelihood activities and market access**. This has also restricted the movement of people and the supply of goods due to roadblocks and extortion, resulting in disrupted market supply and higher commodity prices.

The impacts of the conflict have been compounded by repeated weather shocks as flooding has severely disrupted agricultural and economic activities in this area. The El Niño-related flooding from October to December 2023 displaced thousands of households, almost completely submerged farmlands along the river, and resulted in a **failed *deyr* harvest** in these areas. The prolonged waterlogging

Figure 7. Reference map for Riverine Gravity Irrigation Livelihood Zone of Middle Shabelle Region



Source: FEWS NET

seriously affected off-season cultivation activities from January to March, also causing well below-average off-season maize harvests in March and lower-than-anticipated cereal stocks leading up to June. With large portions of farmland still saturated or even inundated from *deyr* floodwaters, **subsequent flooding in April and May 2024 worsened the situation**, causing further waterlogging and multiple open river breakages in Jowhar District. Much of the population in the affected areas was re-displaced to nearby highland areas. Despite several of the open river breakages getting repaired, the impact of the floods resulted in minimal to no *gu* cultivation in many areas. According to FEWS NET's rapid field assessment in May, the ongoing floods affected 50 to 75 percent of the area under cultivation, and only roughly one-third of the area planted early in the season remains under cultivation in June. Overall, less than 0.2 hectares (of the typical 0.5 hectares) is planted by the average poor household. Additionally, in May and June, extreme temperatures, an extended dry spell, and

atypical pest infestations and crop diseases have further reduced the prospects for accessing green harvests in June.

The post-*deyr* and post-*gu* flood impacts have far-reaching effects on riverine populations' food and income sources. For example, agricultural labor opportunities, which typically contribute over 50 percent of poor households' income, are currently estimated at less than half of normal levels. The lack of carryover stocks from the last *deyr* season crop production and poor off-season production in early 2024 limited own-produced food stocks and poor income from crop sales, which is typically vital for purchasing food and non-food items. Although poor households are accessing income from self-employment activities such as grass collection and sales and some community cash gifts, these sources are insufficient to compensate for the significant loss of agricultural labor income and crop sales. In addition, atypically high maize prices due to the low market supply further constrain poor households' purchasing power and food consumption. Households are facing large food consumption gaps and resorting to severe and unsustainable coping strategies associated with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3), such as begging in the community, relocating to urban areas, relying on wild foods, and increasingly seeking out food loans and gifts. **Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes at the area-level are assessed in the *Riverine Gravity Irrigation* livelihood zone in Middle Shabelle Region in June.**

During the July to September period, as waterlogging decreases due to reduced rainfall and rising temperatures, riverine households are expected to start recessional cultivation in early July. While opportunities for agricultural labor and income for poor households are likely to improve during this time, the ability to earn enough income and produce sufficient crops may be constrained due to limited land available for cultivation, increased labor competition, and limited availability of inputs such as tractor hours and seeds. Nearly full reliance on market purchase for food needs amid above-average maize prices will continue to severely limit purchasing power. **Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely to be sustained through September**.

During the October to January period, slightly increased food stocks from anticipated favorable off-season harvests will support some food and income access in October and the forecast below-average October to December *deyr* rainfall is expected to drive near-normal river water flow with a minimal risk of flooding, allowing farmers to cultivate land and access agricultural labor. While prices will remain elevated during the agropastoral lean season in the south, slight improvements in access to labor income and *gu* offseason cash crop sales will slightly improve purchasing power. Other possible food and income sources from self-employment and social support will remain typical, but insufficient to offset the food and income shortfalls from normal sources. **The food security situation is likely to improve to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) at the area level, although a considerable portion of the population will still have large food consumption gaps and remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across the riverine areas of the Middle Shabelle region.**

See annex on next page.

Annex: Most likely acute food insecurity outcomes and areas receiving significant levels of humanitarian food assistance

Each of these maps adheres to IPC v3.1 humanitarian assistance mapping protocols and flags where significant levels of humanitarian assistance are being/are expected to be provided. 👜 indicates that at least 25 percent of households receive on average 25–50 percent of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance (HFA). 👜 indicates that at least 25 percent of households receive on average over 50 percent of caloric needs through HFA. This mapping protocol differs from the (!) protocol used in the maps at the top of the report. The use of (!) indicates areas that would likely be at least one phase worse in the absence of current or programmed humanitarian assistance.

Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of June 2024



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

Projected acute food insecurity outcomes, July–September 2024



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

Projected acute food insecurity outcomes, October 2024 – January 2025



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU